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Workplace Spirituality and Organizational Hypocrisy:
The Holy Water-Gate Case

ABSTRACT
This paper is based on the sex scandal that enveloped the Archdiocese of Boston in 2002. In the
face of increasing challenges to organizational deviance and silence, this paper showcases how the
Catholic Church, entrusted with the upliftment of Christian spiritual values of its congregation and
society, took the path of organizational hypocrisy. Drawing from the literature on organizational
deviance and silence in profit driven organizations, we examine the practice of pseudo workplace
spirituality. We argue that organizational hypocrisy is a major implication for profit driven
organizations pursuing workplace spirituality for solely legitimacy reasons.
Keywords: Workplace spirituality; organizational hypocrisy; legitimacy, Catholic Church,
legitimacy
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Workplace Spirituality and Organizational Hypocrisy:
The Holy Water-Gate Case

INTRODUCTION
For over 2000 years, the faithful followers have relied on the Catholic Church to uphold the spiritual
values of its founder. The Catholic Church is a religious hierarchical institution entrusted with the
development and protection of Christian spiritual values. It is administered worldwide by Bishops at
diocesan level, and by Archbishops in major cities who are also appointed as Cardinals or ‘princes of the
church’. The United States’ Catholic Archdiocese of Boston (AOB), comprising 2 million Catholics,
administers to over 300 local parishes, each under a parish priest and one or more assistant priests, in 5
regions, each under a bishop, and a range of health, welfare and education agencies. As promoters of
spiritual values, the Church casts the image that it engages in authentic practice of spirituality. Failure of
the AOB to uphold authentic spiritual practices raises the question whether genuine spiritual practice is
possible in profit driven organizations. Highlighting the sexual abuse scandal of the Catholic Church of
Boston and drawing from previous contributions to organizational hypocrisy, institutional theory and
organizational silence, we identify several threats for the authentic practice of workplace spirituality in
profit driven organizations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. It starts with methods used in this paper and then
describes the Holy Water-Gate case. Thereafter, the discussion section includes a critical examination of
how organizational hypocrisy, driven by legitimacy, threatens the authentic practice of workplace
spirituality in profit driven organizations. We conclude the paper by summarizing the implications to
workplace spirituality.

METHODS
The sex scandal that enveloped the Archdiocese of Boston in 2002 raised the question –‘How can
authorities allow this to happen?’ Widely recognized as a pragmatic approach of research in management

2

and organizational studies (Creswell, 1994, 1998; Remenyi et al, 1998; Locke, 2001; Goulding, 2002), a
grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was used to answer this question. Documents
providing evidence of investigations of the deviance and the cover up by the AOB, and books on the
scandal and abuse problem provided data. In addition to these written data, insight proved to be a helpful
resource for theory development as the researchers were able to ‘cultivate crucial insights from personal
experiences’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 252) and carefully use ‘…mental and emotional experiences … in
interpreting the emerging story’ (Goulding, 2002: 63). From that personal experience and analysis of data,
the phenomenon of a ‘nexus of silence’ in the midst of organizational hypocrisy was discovered (Gross,
2005).

THE HOLY WATER-GATE CASE: THE CONTEXT
In the United States in January 2002, the Boston Globe broke the story which triggered a major scandal
for the Catholic Church during its ‘Long Lent of 2002’ (Neuhaus, 2004). This revelation of a ‘holy watergate’ (Healey-Conlon, 2004), which shocked the institution and society, had been preceded by other
accounts of clergy sexual abuse (Shupe, 1995, 1998; Sipe, 1995; Parkinson, 1997; Krebs, 1998). More
detailed accounts followed which collectively contributed to a greater understanding of the deviance and
its mishandling by the AOB and the institution of the church (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002;
Cozzens, 2002; Berry and Renner, 2004: France, 2004). Sexual abuse refers to the sexual exploitation in
some form (verbal or physical, consensual or non-consensual) by an adult person of a child (known as
pedophilia) or a submissive or vulnerable adult. When perpetrated in professional settings by medical
practitioners, counselors, therapists or religious clergy, it involves a sexual boundary violation
(Blaszezynski, 1996). As such, it is regarded as a form of deviance, being a violation of both societal and
institutional rules and norms likely to be disapproved of or punished (Cohen, 1966; Downes and Rock,
1982).
The Boston Globe stories throughout 2002 led the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of the
Attorney-General to conduct an official investigation in July 2003. In what he described as a tragedy of
unimaginable dimensions, the Massachusetts Attorney-General Thomas F. Reilly reported that AOB files
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showed that, over six decades under the administrations of three successive Archbishops, 789 victims
complained of sexual abuse by 250 members of the clergy. Authorities, only accountable to themselves,
protected the reputation of their institution rather than the safety and well-being of children (Reilly,
2003). An Inquiry in 2004 by a National Review Board for the US Conference of Catholic Bishops found
that the response of Boston church leaders to sexual abuse by clergy was characterized by moral laxity,
excessive leniency, insensitivity for victims, secrecy and neglect (Burke, 2004: 92). As Burke reported,
‘there were credible allegations that several thousand [4392] priests, comprising four percent of priests in
ministry over the last half century, committed acts of sexual abuse of [10667] minors’ (2004: 4).
The main context factors that influenced widespread silence in the institution of the church were
its structure based on institutional homogeneity, benevolent authority with decentralized control, lack of
accountability, a culture of elitism and tolerance of deviance, concern for scandal avoidance, a legalistic
approach to problem solving, and lack of knowledge of pedophilia.
In this context, based on data from France (2004) and Reilly (2003), the first allegations are
recorded as having taken place in 1940-1959 (24 cases), which then escalated when Cardinal Cushing was
AOB trustee in 1960-1969 (163 cases), and under Cardinal Medeiros in 1970-1984 (389 cases), declining
under Cardinal Law from 1984-2000 (119 cases). Silence adopted from the outset by victims,
perpetrators, families, peers, bystanders and authorities continued over time as the number of reported
cases grew. But as more people became aware, whistle-blowing commenced and complaints turned to
allegations, civil suits and occasional criminal proceedings. Despite greater knowledge and increasing
signs of widespread abuse, the ‘nexus of silence’ continued.

FIRST INKLINGS: INITIAL RESPONSES TO DEVIANCE (1940-1960)
Between 1940 and 1960, the conflict between the AOB and victims was characterized by avoidance
behavior. The ‘nexus of silence’ can be explained in terms of conflict handling theory (Blake and Mouton
1964). Parties handle conflict in five ways: avoiding, accommodating, compromising, collaborating and
competing. The ‘nexus of silence’ is associated with avoiding and accommodating approaches, and to a
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lesser degree with competing and compromising approaches, while the collaborating approach suggesting
many voices are heard is associated with effort to address the problem openly.
Evidence suggests that the first cases reported were met with shock and disbelief by church
authorities, and reacted to by drawing on cultural practice aimed at avoiding scandal. The AOB
authorities reportedly dealt with the cases in an informal, ad-hoc way, without policies, orally but
sometimes in writing, using vague language in communications (Reilly, 2003: 5). They removed clergy
subject of allegations for treatment in church facilities, later returning them to duty in another location
after medical assessment, on the basis of their understanding of the problem. Given that external
authorities did not intervene, this avoidance approach was initially successful. But it failed to provide
justice to victims, to prevent recidivism by the deviant priest, and see the church adopt policies and
practices to prevent more cases. In this period, avoidance basically swept the problem under the carpet.

COVER UP: RESPONSE TO ESCALATION OF DEVIANCE (1961-2002)
During this next period, when allegations increased and recidivism was evident, church authorities
resorted to cover-up. Escalating commitment (Staw, 1981) and over commitment (Randall, 1987) may
explain continuation with the chosen course of action around this time to hide the deviance and its
handling in order to protect the institution and AOB from scandal and claims. Church authorities
continued with ineffective policies and practices and established an internal bureaucracy for handling sex
abuse cases under a ‘cone of silence’. A common process was established for managing complaints,
medically assessing, treating and supporting offending clergy, reassigning them to other parishes and
dioceses, and handling legal claims. This system failed to seek the assistance of or notify external
authorities of abuse allegations and admissions (Reilly, 2002: 52-57).
As Argyris (1990: xi) suggests is common, organizational defensive routines to maintain morale,
satisfaction and loyalty, at the expense of competence and justice, were enacted to prevent identification
and correction of potentially embarrassing or dangerous errors. These routines prevented accountability
for or discussion on the problem, and its ‘undiscussibility [was] undiscussible’ (1990: 43). Routines
included communication strategies involving use of coded and euphemistic language to minimize the
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problem, and confidential and secret document filing systems. Pastoral support provided to victims with
counseling ‘[urged] them to keep silent’ (Boston Globe - 24 January 2002: 3). Aggrieved families were
silenced by promises of effective action, or by ignoring their emotional public allegations against
individual clergy or the authority itself or suggesting they were dysfunctional (BGIS, 2002: 25). The
Archbishop distanced himself from detailed knowledge of the victims and perpetrators by avoiding direct
contact with the perpetrator or personally calling him to account, and by avoiding direct contact by
sidestepping face-to-face or telephonic conversations with victims, by delegating the detail to loyal
others. In doing so, he was able to plead difficulty in memory recall and denial of detailed knowledge
when called to account, so enjoying ‘ethical distance’ between himself and the state of affairs (Mellema,
2003). Cases were dealt with separately rather than accumulatively, fragmenting knowledge of the
problem, preventing pervasive deviance being understood as a pattern, thereby preventing a major
scandal, at least in the short term. When allegations became legal claims, the church adopted a legalistic
approach (Sitkin and Bies, 1994) in which a litigation mentality was used against perceived threats
(Stutman and Putman, 1994; Randall and Baker, 1994). Legal strategies included confidentiality
agreements tied to out-of-court settlements, and the use of statute of limitations laws to reduce claims.
Church lawyers were paid ‘to limit fiscal liability but create[d] greater anger by compounding clerical
abuse with institutional abuse and the priority to secrecy, and authorities disregard[ed] their pastoral role
and adopt[ed] an adversarial stance to victims in the face of threat’ (Burke, 2004: 8-10). When lawyers
representing the victims moved to civil or criminal claims, the AOB established confidential legal
settlements, cynics later seeing this normal legal practice as use of ‘hush money’ attached to
confidentiality clauses (Robinson, 2003) to secure silence in an ‘unholy alliance’ (BGIS, 2002: 47).
Many institutional stakeholders, including peers, staff of the diocese and medical and legal
professionals, were silent. Evidence and experience suggests that internal stakeholders can be ‘captured
by the culture’ and follow its rules and norms, in this case requiring silence. Aware of increasing signs,
buzz, rumors, and allegations of deviance, but without evidence from informants and witnesses,
stakeholders were discouraged from voicing the church’s strong moral values (Bansal and Kandola,
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2004). While most clergy and diocesan officials would not know of the deviance, others seemed to adhere
to loyalty norms and ‘codes of silence’, as investigations of deviance in sporting teams, police, medical
professions and boarding schools have shown. Burke found that, in regard to key stakeholders aware of
and assisting with administration of the abuse cases, institutional concerns of their local church were
placed above the concerns of the universal church (Burke, 2004: 8-10). As Bishop Oscar Rodriguez,
Salesian Cardinal stated in regard to alleged failure in controlling his Salesian order clergy involved in
similar deviance, ‘…for me it would be a tragedy to reduce the role of a pastor to that of a cop. I’d be
prepared to go to jail rather than harm one of my priests.’(Callinan and Hoare, 2004), and AOB Deputy
Bishop Daily remarked - ‘I am not a policemen; I am a shepherd’ (BGIS, 2002: 24). In addition, silence
among individuals in a group may have become self-reinforcing once one or more decided to avoid
upsetting the relationships among peers (Perlow and Repenning, 2004).
Deviant clergy continued to be ‘coddled’ in being referred for medical treatment, generally
resulting in being given a clean bill of health after some time, only to revert to abuse once more with new
victims. Burke expressed the view that lack of controls for ‘fraternal correction’ of errant clergy to
prevent further deviance, and failure of Bishops to use their authority to protect children from offending
clergy, were some causes of the scandal. Even judges were criticized for complicity between 1992 and
1996 (BGIS, 2002: 125), as were the US mainstream press who ‘were reluctant to cover stories about
priests who sexually abused children’ (Quote from Healey-Conlon, 2004).
Advice to change the approach and get tough on offenders in 1986 by Father Thomas Doyle, and
in 1989 by Bishop Banks, was ignored. Doyle, a canon law professor and Vatican Embassy official in
Washington from 1981 to 1986, with two other experts, had initiated a discussion paper addressing the
widespread problem and calling for a different approach for the US Bishops Conference in 1985, but it
was removed from the agenda (BGIT, 2002: 36). Banks recommended to Cardinal Law that he “clip [a
recidivist offender’s] wings” (BGIT, 2002: 221). In addition, Law ignored medical and his own internal
committee’s advice not to reassign certain clergy. Several staff who challenged the church’s approach
became whistleblowers. As Miceli and Near (1992) have shown, potential whistleblowers are reluctant to
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speak out because of threats to their own personal, social and economic wellbeing by those who want to
maintain silence. Those who did so were punished, as in the case of Doyle for his knowledgeable whistleblowing regarding inaction of Catholic Bishops between 1984 and 1990 (Berry and Renner, 2004; France;
2004). Doyle later became an advocate for victims.
Between 1981 and 1990, the decline in deference and greater knowledge of the abuse resulted in
complaints and allegations becoming civil law suits against the church. A legalistic approach (Sitkin and
Bies, 1994) taken by the AOB, coupled with efforts to hide the scandal, saw both accommodating and
competing approaches taken. Out-of-court and court-directed settlements were often coupled with
confidentiality ‘silencing’ clauses. Statute of limitation provisions were used to defend other cases.
By the 1990s, lawyers for plaintiffs began targeting the Cardinal and authority figures rather than
the diocese as a means of extracting greater compensation for victims, so the accommodation approach
was coupled with a competitive approach. While these approaches and criminal actions against some
offenders attracted occasional media attention, secrecy about the widespread pattern allowed the church to
explain the occasional high profile case as an ‘aberration’ while failing to disclose hundreds of cases
known to the AOB (2002: 45). Following two criminal cases, the AOB moved in 1993 to develop and
publicize new but deficient policy and procedures, only effectively strengthened in 2003 after the scandal
broke.

THE SCANDAL (2002-2003)
It takes the intervention of powerful external forces to break a long established ‘nexus of silence’ in a
major organization or institution. This occurred by accident in 2001 when a routine court filing by the
AOB admitting known recidivism of an alleged offender in a particular civil case was discovered by a
Boston Globe reporter, leading to a team investigation as to whether the particular abuse case was an
anomaly or part of a pattern (BGIT, 2002: ix). After uncovering a pattern, the story was published and the
dam burst. The flood of allegations and stories which resulted saw an end to deference as an irate public
demand answers from the church. The scandal which church authorities tried so hard to prevent was
magnified when the extent of deviance and cover-up was exposed; the Boston Globe’s Investigation alone
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producing over 900 negative news stories throughout 2002 (Robinson, 2003). Despite efforts by the AOB
lawyers to block Boston Globe access to documents, a court decision allowed access by lawyers and the
public to church documents, later used by lawyers of hundreds of victims seeking explanations and
compensation from church authorities (Depositions, 2002-3; 2002: xi).
In 2002, facing state intervention, the AOB unsuccessfully sought to block access to its church
files and resorted to obfuscation to ensure evidence was unavailable and unhelpful. The intervention of
the Attorney-General, Massachusetts, saw an independent and open assessment of the cover up conducted
(Reilly, 2002). But even in this period, to resist dissident church member activity around providing voice
to victims, ‘Cardinal Law in April 2002 ordered priests in his diocese not to cooperate with active groups
within parishes, but groups countered citing Canon Law’ (Boston Globe, 27 November 2002).
Burke later reported that ‘church leaders failed to appreciate the harm to victims, the seriousness
and frequency of the abuse, and so failed to act or to report to civic authorities’ (2004: 93-95). Burke
concluded that fear of scandal caused the authorities to practice secrecy and concealment about sexual
abuse (2004: 8-10) while at the same time giving greater attention to allegations that one of the known
deviant clerics was espousing views publicly on sexual behavior contrary to the church (Deposition:
Bishop Daily 21 August 2002: 33). The authorities were also criticized for their apathy in allowing the
problem to grow over the 50 year period. Apathy resulted in failure of authorities to act energetically,
responsibly and effectively. While, in January 2002, Law admitted that his ‘judgments made in good faith
were tragically wrong’ (Boston Globe 26 January, 2002), Reilly concluded that the AOB, even in 2002,
had still to demonstrate an appropriate sense of urgency for attacking the problem, showing insufficient
commitment to determining the systemic causes of clergy sexual abuse, removing offenders and holding
them accountable, and full information sharing and cooperation with state law enforcement authorities
concerning suspicions or allegations (2002: 16). This apathy was institutional, not confined to the AOB,
nor to the Catholic Church as cases in other churches in 2002-2004 would show (Berry and Renner, 2004:
91-105). In 2005, a grand jury found a similar situation of deliberate concealment in Philadelphia from
1967 to 2002 (Cooperman, 2005).
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When crisis hits, there is a tendency to apportion blame and enact what might be popular but
unhelpful solutions. Inside the church, the US Bishops Conference in June 2002 decided to impose a
‘zero tolerance’ policy on abusers, including clergy, retrospectively, but to exclude bishops despite
several being forced to resign over allegations in 2004 (Collins, 2005: 43). Files were examined in every
US diocese and many priests removed (2005: 93). On the other hand, in late 2002 and early 2003,
Cardinal Law was still obfuscating in his deposition to lawyers representing victims (Depositions, 20023). US Cardinals were summoned to Rome and an apology issued by the Pope on Holy Thursday, 2002
(Collins, 2005: 94).

CLEANING THE AUGEAN STABLES: 2003 TO THE PRESENT
The consequences of the cover up had to be faced. Deviance had increased and stakeholders experienced
the pain and suffering of being betrayed by church authorities who failed to protect the children. The
church suffered economic loss from civil damage suits, costing Boston Archdiocese US$85 million in
2003, with similar amounts in other dioceses in the US and elsewhere, particularly Canada and Ireland.
The scandal reopened debates on sex and other political matters on which the church wanted unity, but
the betrayal and lost reputation had ended deference to clergy and authorities, even to the great majority
of dedicated clergy, and for church authorities and for the church as an institution (Collins, 2005: 91-2).
Transforming an organization caught up in scandal is akin to the Herculean task of ‘cleaning the
Aegean stables’ by diverting a river (Sinclair, 2000: 2). Inquiries are often used to commence this process
effectively or ineffectively. The Inquiry on the abuse by the Attorney General, Massachusetts (Reilly,
2003) and an Inquiry on the crisis by the US Bishops Conference of Catholic Bishops (Burke, 2004) both
released their findings of the publicly. However, the Burke inquiry was not without its political problems,
as the church received further criticism when the original Chair, former Oklahoma Governor Frank
Keating resigned after pressure for speaking out at the early stages, suggesting ‘the church hierarchy were
like the mafia’ (CBS News, 17 June 2003). He was given whistleblower treatment. The transformation
has continued throughout 2002-2004, but may need a more transparent and collaborative approach with
external authorities to prevent further deviant behavior and an end to the ‘nexus of silence’. The public
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jury will stay out on the clean up effort, and withhold judgment on efforts to rebuild the reputation of the
church and trust in its leaders, until such measures show that new incidents of deviance are met
effectively by resolute church authorities.

ORGANIZATIONAL HYPOCRISY AND WORKPLACE SPIRITUALITY
An individual hypocrite is a person ‘espousing having higher standards than is the case’ (Oxford
Dictionary) and ‘having the pretence of virtue, idealism or sympathetic concern used to further selfish
ends’ (Grant, 1997). Organizational hypocrisy is defined in many ways: as voluntary behavior of an
individual acting as an organization trustee whose action does not meet proclaimed values which become
accepted expectations (Phillippe and Koehler, 2005); theory-in-practice inconsistency by managers
(Argyris and Schon, 1974); inconsistency in talk, decisions and action (Brunsson, 1989); espoused values
and principles at odds with action (Kouzes and Pozner, 1993) and organization espousing a single norm
system, but living with a multi-norm system (Huzzard and Ostergren, 2002).
Scandal has enveloped in many organizations and institutions in recent years when the public
becomes aware through the media of ineffective action and cover up by trusted authorities. A central task
of management is seen to be management of the values on which public trust is based (Griseri, 1998).
When deviant activity, contrary to espoused values, is allowed, reputation of and trust in the individuals
involved, and the wider organization and even institution, is damaged. Faced with deviance in an
organization, the trustee’s choice is between its espoused values and pragmatic values. For example,
‘protect the children’ vs. “protect the Church’s reputation”. Practicing workplace spirituality and integrity
will see the choice (actioning) of the espoused institutional core value. Hypocrisy will see the choice
(actioning) of the more pragmatic institutional value “protect the Church’s reputation”.
Organizations which fall short of an authentic practice of workplace spirituality but are publicly
claiming such accommodation could be engaging in organizational hypocrisy. The role of religion
appears to be a central and contentious theme in the current workplace spirituality literature (Dent,
Higgins and Wharff, 2005). The spiritual revival in the workplace is attributed to a broader religious
reawakening in America, which remains one of the world’s most observant Christian nations. The
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prevailing spirituality at work discourse within the management discipline has been primarily limited to a
Christian-based inquiry. Previous empirical studies that attempted to address the enactment of workplace
spirituality mainly have adopted either a Christian or secular perspective (Joseph, 2002). The majority of
researchers in the field are themselves Christians and are often associated with universities espousing
Christian beliefs.
Business Week (1999) observes that workplace spirituality is something of a replay of the spiritual
movement that took place at the turn of the last century. It notes that the difference is that in those days,
workers were considered extensions of machines. In the 1930s, the recognition of worker performance
was born and later, in the 70s and 80s, the thinking shifted towards viewing workers not just as bodies
needing sustenance but as people with minds. In 1953, Fortune published an article entitled ‘Businessmen
on Their Knees’ which reported that ‘American businessmen are taking more notice of God’ (Gunther,
2001). The story had a remarkable similarity to the current workplace spirituality phenomenon and noted
that prayer groups were forming and that religious books were climbing up the bestseller lists. The article
posed the question whether ‘Is it a superficial, merely utilitarian movement, or is it a genuinely spiritual
awakening?’
One critic notes ‘America believes that they can not be vanquished by technology or marketing,
but only by faith’ (Austin, 1995:27). Whilst recognizing the considerable positive potential for
acknowledging spirituality in the workplace, concerns remain about possible misapplications in practice
that need to be carefully considered. For example, Business Week (1999) warns of potential conflicts in
American organizations due to widespread accommodation of workplace spirituality, and warns of
skeptics who think it’s yet another one of management’s fads, exploiting people’s faith to make another
dollar. Thus, the practice of workplace spirituality poses several significant challenges to business leaders.
There are concerns both within the academic world and elsewhere in organizations that managers
embrace a spiritual approach to exploit their members without any resulting personal spiritual awareness
or commitment (Joseph, 2002). The top management using such approaches without demonstrating
personal spiritual conviction and commitment would, sooner rather than later, be recognized as cynically
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manipulative and hypocrites, and as a consequence, any transformational initiative so based is unlikely to
be embraced or sustained by staff within their organizations.
The Archdiocese of Boston case demonstrates that socially beneficial outcomes could
compromise the espoused values of a not for profit organization which is entrusted with the promotion
and protection of Christian spirituality in its congregation and society. In the face of pressures from rising
pluralism, declining membership, erosion of authoritative voice over the sexual abuse case and decline in
clergy numbers, one could argue that the Church failed in its duties as the protector and authority of
Christian based spirituality. In failing to practice what it preached, the Church engaged in organizational
hypocrisy. Similarly, driven by a paramount need to maximise profits, for-profit organizations espousing
workplace spirituality are likely to fall victim to the practice of organizational hypocrisy. In this process,
legitimacy appears to be a major influencing factor.
A core assumption of institutional theory is that organizations act to enhance or protect their
legitimacy (Scott, 1995). Consequently, organizations practicing workplace spirituality are likely to be
motivated by legitimacy reasons and it increases the likelihood of engaging in organizational hypocrisy.
When motivated by such legitimacy, the wider acceptance by the stakeholders of these organizations
‘practicing’ spirituality will generate economic and social benefits (Scott, 1995). Such gains in legitimacy
materially benefit an organization by aiding to secure resources or external support. For example,
organizational members could engage in workplace spirituality practices but in reality, those practices
could have been promoted to meet various stakeholder expectations. Thus, workplace spirituality seems
susceptible of being adopted without a genuine commitment to an authentic practice because it can be
used as a tool to seek legitimacy with the stakeholders of the organization.

CONCLUSION
By highlighting the sex scandal that enveloped the Archdiocese of Boston in 2002, we examined
organizational hypocrisy as a critical issue concerning the pseudo practice of workplace spirituality. The
paper showcased how the Catholic Church, entrusted with the upliftment of Christian spiritual values of
its congregation and society, was caught in a wave of deviance and silence. We demonstrated how the
13

Church, as the guardian and trustee of Christian spirituality, abandoned espoused values and integrity to
protect its reputation, and engaged in organizational hypocrisy. Thus, we have shown how organizational
hypocrisy could become a common place occurrence in profit driven organizations pursuing pseudo
workplace spirituality practices for legitimacy reasons.
Future research might focus on the organizational hypocrisy-pseudo workplace spirituality
relationship and explore more closely the presence of a ‘nexus of silence’ prior to engaging in
organizational hypocrisy. Based on similar case studies across different cultural groups and industries,
researchers could develop further models explaining why employees, managers and stakeholders choose
to remain silent about unethical and immoral behavior in organizations.

14

REFERENCES
Argyris, C (1990) Overcoming organizational defenses: Facilitating organizational learning Boston: Allyn
and Bacon.
Argyris, C & Schon, DA (1974) Theory in Practice: increasing professional effectiveness San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Austin, N (1995) Does spirituality at work work? Working Woman, 20(3): 26-28.
Bansal, P & Kandola, S (2004) Corporate social responsibility: Why good people behave badly in
organizations Ivey Business Journal Online Mar/Apr: 1.
Berry, J & Renner, G (2004) Vows of silence: The abuse of power in the papacy of John Paul II Sydney:
Hodder Headline Australia.
Bible Society, (1988) The good news Bible Canberra: The Bible Society of Australia.
Blake, RR Mouton, JS (1964) The new managerial grid Houston: Gulf Publishing Company.
Boston Globe Investigative Staff (2002) Betrayal: The crisis in the Catholic Church Boston: Little Brown
and Co.
Boston Globe, (2002) Spotlight investigation: Abuse in the Catholic Church news reports, accessed on 15
April 2005 at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse.
Brunsson, N (2004) The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions and Actions Herndon: Copenhagen
Business School Press.
Burke, A (2004) A Report on the crisis in the Catholic Church in the United States, Washington: United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops.
Callinan, R & Hoare, D (2004) Shelter for the Shamed The Australian, 6 July: 15.
CBS News, (2003) Keating’s parting shots for Church, accessed on 24 November 2003 at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/13.
Cohen, AK (1966) Deviance and control Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Collins, P (2001) From inquisition to freedom Roseville: Simon and Schuster Australia.

15

Collins, P (2005) God’s new man: The election of Benedict XVI and the legacy of John Paul II
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Cooperman, A (2005) Grand jury in Pa says Church hid sex abuse, accessed on 23 September 2005 at
http://www.washingtonpost.com.
Cozzens, D (2002) Sacred silence: Denial and the crisis in the Church Minnesota: The Liturgical Press
Creswell, JW (1994) Research design: Qualitative and quantitative approaches Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications.
Creswell, JW (1998) Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five traditions Thousand
Oaks: Sage Publications.
Dane, P (2004) Omalous autonomy Brigham Young University Law Review, 5: 1715-1772.
Dent, E, Higgins, E and Wharff, D (2005) Spirituality and leadership: An empirical review.
of definitions, distinctions and embedded assumptions Leadership Quarterly, 16(5): 625.
Deposition

of

Cardinal

Bernard

Law,

(2002),

accessed

on

15

April

2005

at

2005

at

http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse.
Deposition

of

Bishop

Thomas

Daily,

(2002),

accessed

15

April

http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse.
Dowling, G (2001) Creating corporate reputations: Identity, image, and performance Oxford: Oxford
Press
Downes, D & Rock, P (1982) Understanding deviance Oxford: Clarendon Press
France, D (2004) Our fathers: The secret life of the Catholic Church in an age of scandal New York:
Broadway Books
Gibbons P (2000) Spirituality at work: A pre-theoretical overview, MSc Dissertation, University of
London
Glaser, BG & Strauss, A (1967) The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research
Chicago: Aldine Press
Griseri, P (1998) Managing values: Ethical change in organizations London: Macmillan Business

16

Goulding, C (2002) Grounded theory: A practical guide for management, business and market researchers
London: Sage Publications
Gunther, M (2001) July 9 God and business Fortune, 144(1): 58-71 Retrieved February 20, 2004, from
ProQuest database
Healey-Conlon, M (2004) Holy water-gate: Abuse cover-up in the Catholic Church, SBS: Cutting Edge
Video-film Transcript, accessed on 8 September 2005 at http://www.holywater-gate.com/story
Holy Office, (1962) Instruction on the manner of proceeding in cases of solicitation Rome: The Vatican
Press
Huzzard T & Ostergren K (2002) When Norms Collide: Lerning under Organizational Hypocrisy British
Journal of Management Vol 13 pp 47-59
Joseph, M (2002) Leaders and spirituality: A case study Doctoral Dissertation: University of Surrey,
United Kingdom
Kouzes JM & Pozner BZ (1993) Credibility: how leaders gain and lose it, why people demand it San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers
Krebs, T (1998) Church structures that facilitate pedophilia among Roman Catholic clergy’, in Wolves
Within the Fold, A Shupe (ed), 15-32 New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press
Locke, K (2001) Grounded theory in management research London: Sage Publications
Lupu, IC & Tuttle, RW (2004) Sexual misconduct and ecclesiastical immunity, Brigham Young
University Law Review, 5: 1789-1896
Mellema, G (2003) Responsibility, taint and ethical distance in business ethics Journal of Business Ethics,
47(2): 125
Miceli, MP & Near, JP (1992) Blowing the whistle: The organizational and legal implications for
companies and employees New York: Lexington Books
Neuhaus, RJ (2004) Scandal time III: First things, accessed 23 April 2004 at FirstThings.com
Oxford dictionary, thesaurus and wordpower guide (2001) Oxford: Oxford University Press
Parkinson, P (1997) Child sexual abuse and the Churches London: Hodder and Stoughton.

17

Perlow, LA & Repenning, NP (2004) The dynamics of silencing conflict, accessed on 19 August 2005 at
http://web.mit.edu/sloan.
Phillippe TW & Koehler JW (2005) A Factor Analytical Study of Perceived Organizational Hypocrisy
SAM Advanced Management Journal Vol 70:2 pp 13-20.
Powell, WA and DiMaggio, PJ (1991) (eds) The new institutionalism in organizational analysis Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
Randall, DM (1987) Commitment and the organization: The organization man revisited, The Academy of
Management Review, 12(3): 460-471.
Randall, DM and Baker, DD (1994) The threat of legal liability and managerial decision-making learning,
in The Legalistic Organization SB Sitkin & RJ Bies (eds) 169-189 Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications.
Reilly, TF (2003) The sexual abuse of children in the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, Boston:
Office of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Remenyi, D, Williams, B, Money, A & Swartz, E (1998) Doing research in business and management:
An introduction to process and method London: Sage Publications.
Robinson, WV (2003) Shining the globe’s spotlight on the Catholic Church Niemann Reports, 57(1): 55.
Scott, WR (2001) Institutions and organizations Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Scott, WR (1995) Institutions and organizations California: Sage.
Shupe, A (1995) In the name of all that’s holy: A theory of clergy malfeasance New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press.
Shupe, A (1998) (ed) Wolves within the fold New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Sinclair, M (2000) NGOs in Cuba: Principles for cooperation, Working Paper #3, Oxfam America.
Sipe, AWR (1995) Sex, priests, and power: Anatomy of a crisis London: Cassell.
Sitkin, SB & Bies, RJ (1994) The legalistic organization Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Springett, N (2004) Corporate purpose as the basis of moral leadership of the firm, Strategic Change, 13:
297-307.

18

Standards Australia, (1999) Risk management: AS/NZS 4360 Strathfield: Standards Association of
Australia.
Staw, BM (1981) The escalation of commitment to a course of action, Academy of Management Review,
6: 577- 587.
Stutman, RK & Putman, LL (1994) The consequences of language: A metaphorical look at the
legalization of organizations learning in The Legalistic Organization SB Sitkin and RJ Bies,
(eds), 281-302 Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Thompson, JB (1997) Scandal and social theory in media scandals, J Lull and S Hinerman, (eds), 34-64
New York: Columbia University Press.

19

